draft-ietf-quic-tls-29.txt   draft-ietf-quic-tls-latest.txt 
QUIC Working Group M. Thomson, Ed. QUIC Working Group M. Thomson, Ed.
Internet-Draft Mozilla Internet-Draft Mozilla
Intended status: Standards Track S. Turner, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track S. Turner, Ed.
Expires: December 11, 2020 sn3rd Expires: January 14, 2021 sn3rd
June 9, 2020 July 13, 2020
Using TLS to Secure QUIC Using TLS to Secure QUIC
draft-ietf-quic-tls-29 draft-ietf-quic-tls-latest
Abstract Abstract
This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to
secure QUIC. secure QUIC.
Note to Readers Note to Readers
Discussion of this draft takes place on the QUIC working group Discussion of this draft takes place on the QUIC working group
mailing list (quic@ietf.org [1]), which is archived at mailing list (quic@ietf.org [1]), which is archived at
skipping to change at page 1, line 42 skipping to change at page 1, line 42
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 11, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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2.1. TLS Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. TLS Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Carrying TLS Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Carrying TLS Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Interface to TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1. Interface to TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.1. Handshake Complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1.1. Handshake Complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.2. Handshake Confirmed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1.2. Handshake Confirmed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.3. Sending and Receiving Handshake Messages . . . . . . 11 4.1.3. Sending and Receiving Handshake Messages . . . . . . 11
4.1.4. Encryption Level Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1.4. Encryption Level Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.5. TLS Interface Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1.5. TLS Interface Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. TLS Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2. TLS Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3. ClientHello Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.3. ClientHello Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4. Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.4. Peer Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.5. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.5. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.6. Enabling 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.6. Enabling 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.7. Accepting and Rejecting 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.7. Accepting and Rejecting 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.8. Validating 0-RTT Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.8. Validating 0-RTT Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.9. HelloRetryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.9. HelloRetryRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.10. TLS Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.10. TLS Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.11. Discarding Unused Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.11. Discarding Unused Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.11.1. Discarding Initial Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.11.1. Discarding Initial Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.11.2. Discarding Handshake Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.11.2. Discarding Handshake Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.11.3. Discarding 0-RTT Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.11.3. Discarding 0-RTT Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5. Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. Packet Protection Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5.1. Packet Protection Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2. Initial Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.2. Initial Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3. AEAD Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.3. AEAD Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4. Header Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.4. Header Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4.1. Header Protection Application . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.4.1. Header Protection Application . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4.2. Header Protection Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.4.2. Header Protection Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.4.3. AES-Based Header Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.4.3. AES-Based Header Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.4.4. ChaCha20-Based Header Protection . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.4.4. ChaCha20-Based Header Protection . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.5. Receiving Protected Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.5. Receiving Protected Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.6. Use of 0-RTT Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 5.6. Use of 0-RTT Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.7. Receiving Out-of-Order Protected Frames . . . . . . . . . 28 5.7. Receiving Out-of-Order Protected Frames . . . . . . . . . 29
5.8. Retry Packet Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.8. Retry Packet Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6. Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 6. Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.1. Initiating a Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6.1. Initiating a Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2. Responding to a Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.2. Responding to a Key Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.3. Timing of Receive Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.3. Timing of Receive Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.4. Sending with Updated Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 6.4. Sending with Updated Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.5. Receiving with Different Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 6.5. Receiving with Different Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.6. Minimum Key Update Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 6.6. Minimum Key Update Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.7. Key Update Error Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 6.7. Key Update Error Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7. Security of Initial Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 7. Security of Initial Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8. QUIC-Specific Adjustments to the TLS Handshake . . . . . . . 37 8. QUIC-Specific Adjustments to the TLS Handshake . . . . . . . 38
8.1. Protocol Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8.1. Protocol Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.2. QUIC Transport Parameters Extension . . . . . . . . . . . 38 8.2. QUIC Transport Parameters Extension . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.3. Removing the EndOfEarlyData Message . . . . . . . . . . . 38 8.3. Removing the EndOfEarlyData Message . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.4. Prohibit TLS Middlebox Compatibility Mode . . . . . . . . 39 8.4. Prohibit TLS Middlebox Compatibility Mode . . . . . . . . 40
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.1. Session Linkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 9.1. Session Linkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.2. Replay Attacks with 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 9.2. Replay Attacks with 0-RTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.3. Packet Reflection Attack Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . 40 9.3. Packet Reflection Attack Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . 41
9.4. Header Protection Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 9.4. Header Protection Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9.5. Header Protection Timing Side-Channels . . . . . . . . . 41 9.5. Header Protection Timing Side-Channels . . . . . . . . . 42
9.6. Key Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 9.6. Key Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
11.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 11.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Appendix A. Sample Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Appendix A. Sample Packet Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.1. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 A.1. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.2. Client Initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A.2. Client Initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A.3. Server Initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 A.3. Server Initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.4. Retry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 A.4. Retry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.5. ChaCha20-Poly1305 Short Header Packet . . . . . . . . . . 49 A.5. ChaCha20-Poly1305 Short Header Packet . . . . . . . . . . 50
Appendix B. Analysis of Limits on AEAD_AES_128_CCM Usage . . . . 51 Appendix B. Analysis of Limits on AEAD_AES_128_CCM Usage . . . . 52
B.1. Confidentiality Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 B.1. Confidentiality Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B.2. Integrity Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 B.2. Integrity Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
C.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 C.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
C.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 C.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
C.3. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 C.3. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
C.4. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 C.4. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
C.5. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 C.5. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
C.6. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 C.6. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
C.7. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 C.7. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
C.8. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 C.8. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
C.9. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 C.9. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
C.10. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 C.10. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
C.11. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 C.11. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
C.12. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 C.12. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
C.13. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 C.13. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
C.14. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 C.14. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
C.15. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 C.15. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
C.16. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 C.16. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
C.17. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 C.17. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
C.18. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 C.18. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
C.19. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 C.19. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
C.20. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 C.20. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
C.21. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 C.21. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
C.22. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 C.22. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
C.23. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 C.23. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
C.24. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 C.24. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
C.25. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 C.25. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
C.26. Since draft-thomson-quic-tls-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 C.26. Since draft-thomson-quic-tls-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes how QUIC [QUIC-TRANSPORT] is secured using This document describes how QUIC [QUIC-TRANSPORT] is secured using
TLS [TLS13]. TLS [TLS13].
TLS 1.3 provides critical latency improvements for connection TLS 1.3 provides critical latency improvements for connection
establishment over previous versions. Absent packet loss, most new establishment over previous versions. Absent packet loss, most new
connections can be established and secured within a single round connections can be established and secured within a single round
trip; on subsequent connections between the same client and server, trip; on subsequent connections between the same client and server,
skipping to change at page 11, line 23 skipping to change at page 11, line 23
recording the lowest packet number sent with 1-RTT keys, and recording the lowest packet number sent with 1-RTT keys, and
comparing it to the Largest Acknowledged field in any received 1-RTT comparing it to the Largest Acknowledged field in any received 1-RTT
ACK frame: once the latter is greater than or equal to the former, ACK frame: once the latter is greater than or equal to the former,
the handshake is confirmed. the handshake is confirmed.
4.1.3. Sending and Receiving Handshake Messages 4.1.3. Sending and Receiving Handshake Messages
In order to drive the handshake, TLS depends on being able to send In order to drive the handshake, TLS depends on being able to send
and receive handshake messages. There are two basic functions on and receive handshake messages. There are two basic functions on
this interface: one where QUIC requests handshake messages and one this interface: one where QUIC requests handshake messages and one
where QUIC provides handshake packets. where QUIC provides bytes that comprise handshake messages.
Before starting the handshake QUIC provides TLS with the transport Before starting the handshake QUIC provides TLS with the transport
parameters (see Section 8.2) that it wishes to carry. parameters (see Section 8.2) that it wishes to carry.
A QUIC client starts TLS by requesting TLS handshake bytes from TLS. A QUIC client starts TLS by requesting TLS handshake bytes from TLS.
The client acquires handshake bytes before sending its first packet. The client acquires handshake bytes before sending its first packet.
A QUIC server starts the process by providing TLS with the client's A QUIC server starts the process by providing TLS with the client's
handshake bytes. handshake bytes.
At any time, the TLS stack at an endpoint will have a current sending At any time, the TLS stack at an endpoint will have a current sending
encryption level and receiving encryption level. Encryption levels encryption level and receiving encryption level. Encryption levels
determine the packet type and keys that are used for protecting data. determine the packet type and keys that are used for protecting data.
Each encryption level is associated with a different sequence of Each encryption level is associated with a different sequence of
bytes, which is reliably transmitted to the peer in CRYPTO frames. bytes, which is reliably transmitted to the peer in CRYPTO frames.
When TLS provides handshake bytes to be sent, they are appended to When TLS provides handshake bytes to be sent, they are appended to
the current flow. Any packet that includes the CRYPTO frame is the handshake bytes for the current encryption level. The encryption
protected using keys from the corresponding encryption level. Four level then determines the type of packet that the resulting CRYPTO
encryption levels are used, producing keys for Initial, 0-RTT, frame is carried in; see Table 1.
Four encryption levels are used, producing keys for Initial, 0-RTT,
Handshake, and 1-RTT packets. CRYPTO frames are carried in just Handshake, and 1-RTT packets. CRYPTO frames are carried in just
three of these levels, omitting the 0-RTT level. These four levels three of these levels, omitting the 0-RTT level. These four levels
correspond to three packet number spaces: Initial and Handshake correspond to three packet number spaces: Initial and Handshake
encrypted packets use their own separate spaces; 0-RTT and 1-RTT encrypted packets use their own separate spaces; 0-RTT and 1-RTT
packets use the application data packet number space. packets use the application data packet number space.
QUIC takes the unprotected content of TLS handshake records as the QUIC takes the unprotected content of TLS handshake records as the
content of CRYPTO frames. TLS record protection is not used by QUIC. content of CRYPTO frames. TLS record protection is not used by QUIC.
QUIC assembles CRYPTO frames into QUIC packets, which are protected QUIC assembles CRYPTO frames into QUIC packets, which are protected
using QUIC packet protection. using QUIC packet protection.
QUIC is only capable of conveying TLS handshake records in CRYPTO QUIC is only capable of conveying TLS handshake records in CRYPTO
frames. TLS alerts are turned into QUIC CONNECTION_CLOSE error frames. TLS alerts are turned into QUIC CONNECTION_CLOSE error
codes; see Section 4.10. TLS application data and other message codes; see Section 4.10. TLS application data and other message
types cannot be carried by QUIC at any encryption level and is an types cannot be carried by QUIC at any encryption level and is an
error if they are received from the TLS stack. error if they are received from the TLS stack.
When an endpoint receives a QUIC packet containing a CRYPTO frame When an endpoint receives a QUIC packet containing a CRYPTO frame
from the network, it proceeds as follows: from the network, it proceeds as follows:
o If the packet was in the TLS receiving encryption level, sequence o If the packet uses the current TLS receiving encryption level,
the data into the input flow as usual. As with STREAM frames, the sequence the data into the input flow as usual. As with STREAM
offset is used to find the proper location in the data sequence. frames, the offset is used to find the proper location in the data
If the result of this process is that new data is available, then sequence. If the result of this process is that new data is
it is delivered to TLS in order. available, then it is delivered to TLS in order.
o If the packet is from a previously installed encryption level, it o If the packet is from a previously installed encryption level, it
MUST NOT contain data which extends past the end of previously MUST NOT contain data which extends past the end of previously
received data in that flow. Implementations MUST treat any received data in that flow. Implementations MUST treat any
violations of this requirement as a connection error of type violations of this requirement as a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
o If the packet is from a new encryption level, it is saved for o If the packet is from a new encryption level, it is saved for
later processing by TLS. Once TLS moves to receiving from this later processing by TLS. Once TLS moves to receiving from this
encryption level, saved data can be provided. When providing data encryption level, saved data can be provided to TLS. When
from any new encryption level to TLS, if there is data from a providing data from any new encryption level to TLS, if there is
previous encryption level that TLS has not consumed, this MUST be data from a previous encryption level that TLS has not consumed,
treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. this MUST be treated as a connection error of type
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION.
Each time that TLS is provided with new data, new handshake bytes are Each time that TLS is provided with new data, new handshake bytes are
requested from TLS. TLS might not provide any bytes if the handshake requested from TLS. TLS might not provide any bytes if the handshake
messages it has received are incomplete or it has no data to send. messages it has received are incomplete or it has no data to send.
The content of CRYPTO frames might either be processed incrementally
by TLS or buffered until complete messages or flights are available.
TLS is responsible for buffering handshake bytes that have arrived in
order. QUIC is responsible for buffering handshake bytes that arrive
out of order or for encryption levels that are not yet ready. QUIC
does not provide any means of flow control for CRYPTO frames; see
Section 7.5 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT].
Once the TLS handshake is complete, this is indicated to QUIC along Once the TLS handshake is complete, this is indicated to QUIC along
with any final handshake bytes that TLS needs to send. TLS also with any final handshake bytes that TLS needs to send. TLS also
provides QUIC with the transport parameters that the peer advertised provides QUIC with the transport parameters that the peer advertised
during the handshake. during the handshake.
Once the handshake is complete, TLS becomes passive. TLS can still Once the handshake is complete, TLS becomes passive. TLS can still
receive data from its peer and respond in kind, but it will not need receive data from its peer and respond in kind, but it will not need
to send more data unless specifically requested - either by an to send more data unless specifically requested - either by an
application or QUIC. One reason to send data is that the server application or QUIC. One reason to send data is that the server
might wish to provide additional or updated session tickets to a might wish to provide additional or updated session tickets to a
skipping to change at page 14, line 14 skipping to change at page 14, line 25
QUIC also needs access to keys that might not ordinarily be available QUIC also needs access to keys that might not ordinarily be available
to a TLS implementation. For instance, a client might need to to a TLS implementation. For instance, a client might need to
acknowledge Handshake packets before it is ready to send CRYPTO acknowledge Handshake packets before it is ready to send CRYPTO
frames at that encryption level. TLS therefore needs to provide keys frames at that encryption level. TLS therefore needs to provide keys
to QUIC before it might produce them for its own use. to QUIC before it might produce them for its own use.
4.1.5. TLS Interface Summary 4.1.5. TLS Interface Summary
Figure 5 summarizes the exchange between QUIC and TLS for both client Figure 5 summarizes the exchange between QUIC and TLS for both client
and server. Each arrow is tagged with the encryption level used for and server. Solid arrows indicate packets that carry handshake data;
that transmission. dashed arrows show where application data can be sent. Each arrow is
tagged with the encryption level used for that transmission.
Client Server Client Server
====== ======
Get Handshake Get Handshake
Initial -------------> Initial ------------->
Handshake Received
Install tx 0-RTT Keys Install tx 0-RTT Keys
0-RTT ---------------> 0-RTT - - - - - - - ->
Handshake Received
Get Handshake Get Handshake
<------------- Initial <------------- Initial
Handshake Received
Install Handshake keys
Install rx 0-RTT keys Install rx 0-RTT keys
Install Handshake keys Install Handshake keys
Get Handshake Get Handshake
<----------- Handshake <----------- Handshake
Handshake Received
Install tx 1-RTT keys Install tx 1-RTT keys
<--------------- 1-RTT <- - - - - - - - 1-RTT
Handshake Received (Initial)
Install Handshake keys
Handshake Received (Handshake)
Get Handshake Get Handshake
Handshake Complete
Handshake -----------> Handshake ----------->
Handshake Complete
Install 1-RTT keys
1-RTT - - - - - - - ->
Handshake Received Handshake Received
Install rx 1-RTT keys
Handshake Complete Handshake Complete
Install 1-RTT keys Install rx 1-RTT keys
1-RTT --------------->
Get Handshake
<--------------- 1-RTT
Handshake Received
Figure 5: Interaction Summary between QUIC and TLS Figure 5: Interaction Summary between QUIC and TLS
Figure 5 shows the multiple packets that form a single "flight" of Figure 5 shows the multiple packets that form a single "flight" of
messages being processed individually, to show what incoming messages messages being processed individually, to show what incoming messages
trigger different actions. New handshake messages are requested trigger different actions. New handshake messages are requested
after all incoming packets have been processed. This process might after incoming packets have been processed. This process varies
vary depending on how QUIC implementations and the packets they based on the structure of endpoint implementations and the order in
receive are structured. which packets arrive; this is intended to illustrate the steps
involved in a single handshake exchange.
4.2. TLS Version 4.2. TLS Version
This document describes how TLS 1.3 [TLS13] is used with QUIC. This document describes how TLS 1.3 [TLS13] is used with QUIC.
In practice, the TLS handshake will negotiate a version of TLS to In practice, the TLS handshake will negotiate a version of TLS to
use. This could result in a newer version of TLS than 1.3 being use. This could result in a newer version of TLS than 1.3 being
negotiated if both endpoints support that version. This is negotiated if both endpoints support that version. This is
acceptable provided that the features of TLS 1.3 that are used by acceptable provided that the features of TLS 1.3 that are used by
QUIC are supported by the newer version. QUIC are supported by the newer version.
A badly configured TLS implementation could negotiate TLS 1.2 or Clients MUST NOT offer TLS versions older than 1.3. A badly
another older version of TLS. An endpoint MUST terminate the configured TLS implementation could negotiate TLS 1.2 or another
connection if a version of TLS older than 1.3 is negotiated. older version of TLS. An endpoint MUST terminate the connection if a
version of TLS older than 1.3 is negotiated.
4.3. ClientHello Size 4.3. ClientHello Size
The first Initial packet from a client contains the start or all of The first Initial packet from a client contains the start or all of
its first cryptographic handshake message, which for TLS is the its first cryptographic handshake message, which for TLS is the
ClientHello. Servers might need to parse the entire ClientHello ClientHello. Servers might need to parse the entire ClientHello
(e.g., to access extensions such as Server Name Identification (SNI) (e.g., to access extensions such as Server Name Identification (SNI)
or Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)) in order to decide or Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)) in order to decide
whether to accept the new incoming QUIC connection. If the whether to accept the new incoming QUIC connection. If the
ClientHello spans multiple Initial packets, such servers would need ClientHello spans multiple Initial packets, such servers would need
skipping to change at page 16, line 23 skipping to change at page 17, line 16
The requirements for authentication depend on the application The requirements for authentication depend on the application
protocol that is in use. TLS provides server authentication and protocol that is in use. TLS provides server authentication and
permits the server to request client authentication. permits the server to request client authentication.
A client MUST authenticate the identity of the server. This A client MUST authenticate the identity of the server. This
typically involves verification that the identity of the server is typically involves verification that the identity of the server is
included in a certificate and that the certificate is issued by a included in a certificate and that the certificate is issued by a
trusted entity (see for example [RFC2818]). trusted entity (see for example [RFC2818]).
Note: Where servers provide certificates for authentication, the
size of the certificate chain can consume a large number of bytes.
Controlling the size of certificate chains is critical to
performance in QUIC as servers are limited to sending 3 bytes for
every byte received prior to validating the client address; see
Section 8.1 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT]. The size of a certificate chain
can be managed by limiting the number of names or extensions;
using keys with small public key representations, like ECDSA; or
by using certificate compression [COMPRESS].
A server MAY request that the client authenticate during the A server MAY request that the client authenticate during the
handshake. A server MAY refuse a connection if the client is unable handshake. A server MAY refuse a connection if the client is unable
to authenticate when requested. The requirements for client to authenticate when requested. The requirements for client
authentication vary based on application protocol and deployment. authentication vary based on application protocol and deployment.
A server MUST NOT use post-handshake client authentication (as A server MUST NOT use post-handshake client authentication (as
defined in Section 4.6.2 of [TLS13]), because the multiplexing defined in Section 4.6.2 of [TLS13]), because the multiplexing
offered by QUIC prevents clients from correlating the certificate offered by QUIC prevents clients from correlating the certificate
request with the application-level event that triggered it (see request with the application-level event that triggered it (see
[HTTP2-TLS13]). More specifically, servers MUST NOT send post- [HTTP2-TLS13]). More specifically, servers MUST NOT send post-
skipping to change at page 23, line 39 skipping to change at page 24, line 44
Some AEAD functions have limits for how many packets can be encrypted Some AEAD functions have limits for how many packets can be encrypted
under the same key and IV (see for example [AEBounds]). This might under the same key and IV (see for example [AEBounds]). This might
be lower than the packet number limit. An endpoint MUST initiate a be lower than the packet number limit. An endpoint MUST initiate a
key update (Section 6) prior to exceeding any limit set for the AEAD key update (Section 6) prior to exceeding any limit set for the AEAD
that is in use. that is in use.
5.4. Header Protection 5.4. Header Protection
Parts of QUIC packet headers, in particular the Packet Number field, Parts of QUIC packet headers, in particular the Packet Number field,
are protected using a key that is derived separate to the packet are protected using a key that is derived separately from the packet
protection key and IV. The key derived using the "quic hp" label is protection key and IV. The key derived using the "quic hp" label is
used to provide confidentiality protection for those fields that are used to provide confidentiality protection for those fields that are
not exposed to on-path elements. not exposed to on-path elements.
This protection applies to the least-significant bits of the first This protection applies to the least-significant bits of the first
byte, plus the Packet Number field. The four least-significant bits byte, plus the Packet Number field. The four least-significant bits
of the first byte are protected for packets with long headers; the of the first byte are protected for packets with long headers; the
five least significant bits of the first byte are protected for five least significant bits of the first byte are protected for
packets with short headers. For both header forms, this covers the packets with short headers. For both header forms, this covers the
reserved bits and the Packet Number Length field; the Key Phase bit reserved bits and the Packet Number Length field; the Key Phase bit
skipping to change at page 43, line 45 skipping to change at page 44, line 45
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301, Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>. July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[CHACHA] Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF [CHACHA] Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF
Protocols", RFC 8439, DOI 10.17487/RFC8439, June 2018, Protocols", RFC 8439, DOI 10.17487/RFC8439, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8439>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8439>.
[QUIC-RECOVERY] [QUIC-RECOVERY]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection
and Congestion Control", draft-ietf-quic-recovery-29 (work and Congestion Control", draft-ietf-quic-recovery-latest
in progress). (work in progress).
[QUIC-TRANSPORT] [QUIC-TRANSPORT]
Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic- Multiplexed and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-
transport-29 (work in progress). transport-latest (work in progress).
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
skipping to change at page 44, line 39 skipping to change at page 45, line 39
[AEBounds] [AEBounds]
Luykx, A. and K. Paterson, "Limits on Authenticated Luykx, A. and K. Paterson, "Limits on Authenticated
Encryption Use in TLS", March 2016, Encryption Use in TLS", March 2016,
<http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/TLS-AEbounds.pdf>. <http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/TLS-AEbounds.pdf>.
[CCM-ANALYSIS] [CCM-ANALYSIS]
Jonsson, J., "On the Security of CTR + CBC-MAC", Selected Jonsson, J., "On the Security of CTR + CBC-MAC", Selected
Areas in Cryptography pp. 76-93, Areas in Cryptography pp. 76-93,
DOI 10.1007/3-540-36492-7_7, 2003. DOI 10.1007/3-540-36492-7_7, 2003.
[COMPRESS]
Ghedini, A. and V. Vasiliev, "TLS Certificate
Compression", draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-10
(work in progress), January 2020.
[HTTP2-TLS13] [HTTP2-TLS13]
Benjamin, D., "Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2", RFC 8740, Benjamin, D., "Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2", RFC 8740,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8740, February 2020, DOI 10.17487/RFC8740, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8740>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8740>.
[IMC] Katz, J. and Y. Lindell, "Introduction to Modern [IMC] Katz, J. and Y. Lindell, "Introduction to Modern
Cryptography, Second Edition", ISBN 978-1466570269, Cryptography, Second Edition", ISBN 978-1466570269,
November 2014. November 2014.
[NAN] Bellare, M., Ng, R., and B. Tackmann, "Nonces Are Noticed: [NAN] Bellare, M., Ng, R., and B. Tackmann, "Nonces Are Noticed:
AEAD Revisited", Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2019 pp. AEAD Revisited", Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2019 pp.
235-265, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9, 2019. 235-265, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9, 2019.
[QUIC-HTTP] [QUIC-HTTP]
Bishop, M., Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 3 Bishop, M., Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 3
(HTTP/3)", draft-ietf-quic-http-29 (work in progress). (HTTP/3)", draft-ietf-quic-http-latest (work in progress).
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[ROBUST] Fischlin, M., Guenther, F., and C. Janson, "Robust [ROBUST] Fischlin, M., Guenther, F., and C. Janson, "Robust
Channels: Handling Unreliable Networks in the Record Channels: Handling Unreliable Networks in the Record
Layers of QUIC and DTLS", February 2020, Layers of QUIC and DTLS 1.3", May 2020,
<https://www.felixguenther.info/docs/ <https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/718>.
QUIPS2020_RobustChannels.pdf>.
11.3. URIs 11.3. URIs
[1] mailto:quic@ietf.org [1] mailto:quic@ietf.org
Appendix A. Sample Packet Protection Appendix A. Sample Packet Protection
This section shows examples of packet protection so that This section shows examples of packet protection so that
implementations can be verified incrementally. Samples of Initial implementations can be verified incrementally. Samples of Initial
packets from both client and server, plus a Retry packet are defined. packets from both client and server, plus a Retry packet are defined.
skipping to change at page 47, line 5 skipping to change at page 48, line 5
hp = HKDF-Expand-Label(server_initial_secret, "quic hp", _, 16) hp = HKDF-Expand-Label(server_initial_secret, "quic hp", _, 16)
= c0c499a65a60024a18a250974ea01dfa = c0c499a65a60024a18a250974ea01dfa
A.2. Client Initial A.2. Client Initial
The client sends an Initial packet. The unprotected payload of this The client sends an Initial packet. The unprotected payload of this
packet contains the following CRYPTO frame, plus enough PADDING packet contains the following CRYPTO frame, plus enough PADDING
frames to make a 1162 byte payload: frames to make a 1162 byte payload:
060040c4010000c003036660261ff947 cea49cce6cfad687f457cf1b14531ba1 060040f1010000ed0303ebf8fa56f129 39b9584a3896472ec40bb863cfd3e868
4131a0e8f309a1d0b9c4000006130113 031302010000910000000b0009000006 04fe3a47f06a2b69484c000004130113 02010000c000000010000e00000b6578
736572766572ff01000100000a001400 12001d00170018001901000101010201 616d706c652e636f6dff01000100000a 00080006001d00170018001000070005
03010400230000003300260024001d00 204cfdfcd178b784bf328cae793b136f 04616c706e0005000501000000000033 00260024001d00209370b2c9caa47fba
2aedce005ff183d7bb14952072366470 37002b0003020304000d0020001e0403 baf4559fedba753de171fa71f50f1ce1 5d43e994ec74d748002b000302030400
05030603020308040805080604010501 060102010402050206020202002d0002 0d0010000e0403050306030203080408 050806002d00020101001c00024001ff
0101001c00024001 a500320408ffffffffffffffff050480 00ffff07048000ffff08011001048000
75300901100f088394c8f03e51570806 048000ffff
The unprotected header includes the connection ID and a 4 byte packet The unprotected header includes the connection ID and a 4 byte packet
number encoding for a packet number of 2: number encoding for a packet number of 2:
c3ff00001d088394c8f03e5157080000449e00000002 c3ff00001d088394c8f03e5157080000449e00000002
Protecting the payload produces output that is sampled for header Protecting the payload produces output that is sampled for header
protection. Because the header uses a 4 byte packet number encoding, protection. Because the header uses a 4 byte packet number encoding,
the first 16 bytes of the protected payload is sampled, then applied the first 16 bytes of the protected payload is sampled, then applied
to the header: to the header:
sample = fb66bc5f93032b7ddd89fe0ff15d9c4f sample = fb66bc6a93032b50dd8973972d149421
mask = AES-ECB(hp, sample)[0..4] mask = AES-ECB(hp, sample)[0..4]
= d64a952459 = 1e9cdb9909
header[0] ^= mask[0] & 0x0f header[0] ^= mask[0] & 0x0f
= c5 = cd
header[18..21] ^= mask[1..4] header[18..21] ^= mask[1..4]
= 4a95245b = 9cdb990b
header = c5ff00001d088394c8f03e5157080000449e4a95245b header = cdff00001d088394c8f03e5157080000449e9cdb990b
The resulting protected packet is: The resulting protected packet is:
c5ff00001d088394c8f03e5157080000 449e4a95245bfb66bc5f93032b7ddd89 cdff00001d088394c8f03e5157080000 449e9cdb990bfb66bc6a93032b50dd89
fe0ff15d9c4f7050fccdb71c1cd80512 d4431643a53aafa1b0b518b44968b18b 73972d149421874d3849e3708d71354e a33bcdc356f3ea6e2a1a1bd7c3d14003
8d3e7a4d04c30b3ed9410325b2abb2da fb1c12f8b70479eb8df98abcaf95dd8f 8d3e784d04c30a2cdb40c32523aba2da fe1c1bf3d27a6be38fe38ae033fbb071
3d1c78660fbc719f88b23c8aef6771f3 d50e10fdfb4c9d92386d44481b6c52d5 3c1c73661bb6639795b42b97f77068ea d51f11fbf9489af2501d09481e6c64d4
9e5538d3d3942de9f13a7f8b702dc317 24180da9df22714d01003fc5e3d165c9 b8551cd3cea70d830ce2aeeec789ef55 1a7fbe36b3f7e1549a9f8d8e153b3fac
50e630b8540fbd81c9df0ee63f949970 26c4f2e1887a2def79050ac2d86ba318 3fb7b7812c9ed7c20b4be190ebd89956 26e7f0fc887925ec6f0606c5d36aa81b
e0b3adc4c5aa18bcf63c7cf8e85f5692 49813a2236a7e72269447cd1c755e451 ebb7aacdc4a31bb5f23d55faef5c5190 5783384f375a43235b5c742c78ab1bae
f5e77470eb3de64c8849d29282069802 9cfa18e5d66176fe6e5ba4ed18026f90 0a188b75efbde6b3774ed61282f9670a 9dea19e1566103ce675ab4e21081fb58
900a5b4980e2f58e39151d5cd685b109 29636d4f02e7fad2a5a458249f5c0298 60340a1e88e4f10e39eae25cd685b109 29636d4f02e7fad2a5a458249f5c0298
a6d53acbe41a7fc83fa7cc01973f7a74 d1237a51974e097636b6203997f921d0 a6d53acbe41a7fc83fa7cc01973f7a74 d1237a51974e097636b6203997f921d0
7bc1940a6f2d0de9f5a11432946159ed 6cc21df65c4ddd1115f86427259a196c 7bc1940a6f2d0de9f5a11432946159ed 6cc21df65c4ddd1115f86427259a196c
7148b25b6478b0dc7766e1c4d1b1f515 9f90eabc61636226244642ee148b464c 7148b25b6478b0dc7766e1c4d1b1f515 9f90eabc61636226244642ee148b464c
9e619ee50a5e3ddc836227cad938987c 4ea3c1fa7c75bbf88d89e9ada642b2b8 9e619ee50a5e3ddc836227cad938987c 4ea3c1fa7c75bbf88d89e9ada642b2b8
8fe8107b7ea375b1b64889a4e9e5c38a 1c896ce275a5658d250e2d76e1ed3a34 8fe8107b7ea375b1b64889a4e9e5c38a 1c896ce275a5658d250e2d76e1ed3a34
ce7e3a3f383d0c996d0bed106c2899ca 6fc263ef0455e74bb6ac1640ea7bfedc ce7e3a3f383d0c996d0bed106c2899ca 6fc263ef0455e74bb6ac1640ea7bfedc
59f03fee0e1725ea150ff4d69a7660c5 542119c71de270ae7c3ecfd1af2c4ce5 59f03fee0e1725ea150ff4d69a7660c5 542119c71de270ae7c3ecfd1af2c4ce5
51986949cc34a66b3e216bfe18b347e6 c05fd050f85912db303a8f054ec23e38 51986949cc34a66b3e216bfe18b347e6 c05fd050f85912db303a8f054ec23e38
f44d1c725ab641ae929fecc8e3cefa56 19df4231f5b4c009fa0c0bbc60bc75f7 f44d1c725ab641ae929fecc8e3cefa56 19df4231f5b4c009fa0c0bbc60bc75f7
6d06ef154fc8577077d9d6a1d2bd9bf0 81dc783ece60111bea7da9e5a9748069 6d06ef154fc8577077d9d6a1d2bd9bf0 81dc783ece60111bea7da9e5a9748069
skipping to change at page 48, line 42 skipping to change at page 49, line 42
1da2304d6a0fd5d07d08372202369661 59bef3cf904d722324dd852513df39ae 1da2304d6a0fd5d07d08372202369661 59bef3cf904d722324dd852513df39ae
030d8173908da6364786d3c1bfcb19ea 77a63b25f1e7fc661def480c5d00d444 030d8173908da6364786d3c1bfcb19ea 77a63b25f1e7fc661def480c5d00d444
56269ebd84efd8e3a8b2c257eec76060 682848cbf5194bc99e49ee75e4d0d254 56269ebd84efd8e3a8b2c257eec76060 682848cbf5194bc99e49ee75e4d0d254
bad4bfd74970c30e44b65511d4ad0e6e c7398e08e01307eeeea14e46ccd87cf3 bad4bfd74970c30e44b65511d4ad0e6e c7398e08e01307eeeea14e46ccd87cf3
6b285221254d8fc6a6765c524ded0085 dca5bd688ddf722e2c0faf9d0fb2ce7a 6b285221254d8fc6a6765c524ded0085 dca5bd688ddf722e2c0faf9d0fb2ce7a
0c3f2cee19ca0ffba461ca8dc5d2c817 8b0762cf67135558494d2a96f1a139f0 0c3f2cee19ca0ffba461ca8dc5d2c817 8b0762cf67135558494d2a96f1a139f0
edb42d2af89a9c9122b07acbc29e5e72 2df8615c343702491098478a389c9872 edb42d2af89a9c9122b07acbc29e5e72 2df8615c343702491098478a389c9872
a10b0c9875125e257c7bfdf27eef4060 bd3d00f4c14fd3e3496c38d3c5d1a566 a10b0c9875125e257c7bfdf27eef4060 bd3d00f4c14fd3e3496c38d3c5d1a566
8c39350effbc2d16ca17be4ce29f02ed 969504dda2a8c6b9ff919e693ee79e09 8c39350effbc2d16ca17be4ce29f02ed 969504dda2a8c6b9ff919e693ee79e09
089316e7d1d89ec099db3b2b268725d8 88536a4b8bf9aee8fb43e82a4d919d48 089316e7d1d89ec099db3b2b268725d8 88536a4b8bf9aee8fb43e82a4d919d48
43b1ca70a2d8d3f725ead1391377dcc0 1802771a449b30f3fa2289852607b660
A.3. Server Initial A.3. Server Initial
The server sends the following payload in response, including an ACK The server sends the following payload in response, including an ACK
frame, a CRYPTO frame, and no PADDING frames: frame, a CRYPTO frame, and no PADDING frames:
0d0000000018410a020000560303eefc e7f7b37ba1d1632e96677825ddf73988 02000000000600405a020000560303ee fce7f7b37ba1d1632e96677825ddf739
cfc79825df566dc5430b9a045a120013 0100002e00330024001d00209d3c940d 88cfc79825df566dc5430b9a045a1200 130100002e00330024001d00209d3c94
89690b84d08a60993c144eca684d1081 287c834d5311bcf32bb9da1a002b0002 0d89690b84d08a60993c144eca684d10 81287c834d5311bcf32bb9da1a002b00
0304 020304
The header from the server includes a new connection ID and a 2-byte The header from the server includes a new connection ID and a 2-byte
packet number encoding for a packet number of 1: packet number encoding for a packet number of 1:
c1ff00001d0008f067a5502a4262b50040740001 c1ff00001d0008f067a5502a4262b50040740001
As a result, after protection, the header protection sample is taken As a result, after protection, the header protection sample is taken
starting from the third protected octet: starting from the third protected octet:
sample = 823a5d3a1207c86ee49132824f046524 sample = 823a5d3a1207c86ee49132824f046524
mask = abaaf34fdc mask = abaaf34fdc
header = caff00001d0008f067a5502a4262b5004074aaf2 header = caff00001d0008f067a5502a4262b5004074aaf2
The final protected packet is then: The final protected packet is then:
caff00001d0008f067a5502a4262b500 4074aaf2f007823a5d3a1207c86ee491 c7ff00001d0008f067a5502a4262b500 4075fb12ff07823a5d24534d906ce4c7
32824f0465243d082d868b107a38092b c80528664cbf9456ebf27673fb5fa506 6782a2167e3479c0f7f6395dc2c91676 302fe6d70bb7cbeb117b4ddb7d173498
1ab573c9f001b81da028a00d52ab00b1 5bebaa70640e106cf2acd043e9c6b441 44fd61dae200b8338e1b932976b61d91 e64a02e9e0ee72e3a6f63aba4ceeeec5
1c0a79637134d8993701fe779e58c2fe 753d14b0564021565ea92e57bc6faf56 be2f24f2d86027572943533846caa13e 6f163fb257473dcca25396e88724f1e5
dfc7a40870e6 d964dedee9b633
A.4. Retry A.4. Retry
This shows a Retry packet that might be sent in response to the This shows a Retry packet that might be sent in response to the
Initial packet in Appendix A.2. The integrity check includes the Initial packet in Appendix A.2. The integrity check includes the
client-chosen connection ID value of 0x8394c8f03e515708, but that client-chosen connection ID value of 0x8394c8f03e515708, but that
value is not included in the final Retry packet: value is not included in the final Retry packet:
ffff00001d0008f067a5502a4262b574 6f6b656ed16926d81f6f9ca2953a8aa4 ffff00001d0008f067a5502a4262b574 6f6b656ed16926d81f6f9ca2953a8aa4
575e1e49 575e1e49
skipping to change at page 53, line 11 skipping to change at page 54, line 11
publication of a final version of this document. publication of a final version of this document.
Issue and pull request numbers are listed with a leading octothorp. Issue and pull request numbers are listed with a leading octothorp.
C.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-28 C.1. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-28
o Defined limits on the number of packets that can be protected with o Defined limits on the number of packets that can be protected with
a single key and limits on the number of packets that can fail a single key and limits on the number of packets that can fail
authentication (#3619, #3620) authentication (#3619, #3620)
o Update Initial salt, Retry keys, and samples (#3711)
C.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-27 C.2. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-27
o Allowed CONNECTION_CLOSE in any packet number space, with o Allowed CONNECTION_CLOSE in any packet number space, with
restrictions on use of the application-specific variant (#3430, restrictions on use of the application-specific variant (#3430,
#3435, #3440) #3435, #3440)
o Prohibit the use of the compatibility mode from TLS 1.3 (#3594, o Prohibit the use of the compatibility mode from TLS 1.3 (#3594,
#3595) #3595)
C.3. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-26 C.3. Since draft-ietf-quic-tls-26
 End of changes. 40 change blocks. 
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