|Network Working Group||J. Reschke|
|Updates: 2617 (if approved)||January 29, 2012|
|Intended status: Standards Track|
|Expires: August 1, 2012|
An Encoding Parameter for HTTP Basic Authentication
The "Basic" authentication scheme defined in RFC 2617 does not properly define how to treat non-ASCII characters. This has lead to a situation where user agent implementations disagree, and servers make different assumptions based on the locales they are running in. There is little interoperability for characters in the ISO-8859-1 character set, and even less interoperability for any characters beyond that.
This document defines a backwards-compatible extension to "Basic", specifying the server's character encoding expectation, using a new authentication scheme parameter.
Distribution of this document is unlimited. Although this is not a work item of the HTTPbis Working Group, comments should be sent to the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) mailing list at firstname.lastname@example.org, which may be joined by sending a message with subject "subscribe" to email@example.com.
Discussions of the HTTPbis Working Group are archived at <http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/>.
XML versions, latest edits and the issues list for this document are available from <http://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/#draft-reschke-basicauth-enc>.
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|I edit (type: edit, status: open)|
|firstname.lastname@example.org||2010-08-11||Umbrella issue for editorial fixes/enhancements.|
|Associated changes in this document: 7, A.1, A.1, C.|
|I proxy (type: change, status: closed)|
|email@example.com||2012-01-26||I assume this is also not limited to WWW-Authenticate:. But applies equally to Proxy-Authenticate?|
|Resolution: Add matching example for Proxy-Authenticate.|
|Associated changes in this document: 4.|
The "Basic" authentication scheme defined in Section 2 of [RFC2617] does not properly define how to treat non-ASCII characters ([USASCII]): it uses the Base64 ([RFC4648], Section 4) encoding of the concatenation of username, separator character, and password without stating which character encoding to use.¶
This has lead to a situation where user agent implementations disagree, and servers make different assumptions based on the locales they are running in. There is little interoperability for characters in the ISO-8859-1 character set ([ISO-8859-1]), and even less interoperability for any characters beyond that.¶
In challenges, servers MAY use the "encoding" authentication parameter (case-insensitive) to express the character encoding they expect the user agent to use.¶
Other values are reserved for future use.¶
For credentials sent by the user agent, the "encoding" parameter is reserved for future use and MUST NOT be sent.¶
The reason for this is that the information that could be included does not seem to be useful to the server, but the additional complexity of parsing and processing the additional parameter might make this extension harder to deploy.¶
In the example below, the server prompts for authentication in the "foo" realm, using Basic authentication, with a preference for the UTF-8 character encoding:
WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="foo", encoding="UTF-8"
Note that the parameter value can be either a token or a quoted string; in this case the server chose to use the quoted-string notation.
The user's name is "test", and his password is the string "123" followed by the Unicode character U+00A3 (POUND SIGN). Following Section 1.2 of [RFC2617], but using the character encoding UTF-8, the user-pass, converted to a sequence of octets, is:¶
't' 'e' 's' 't' ':' '1' '2' '3' pound 74 65 73 74 3A 31 32 33 C2 A3
Thus the Authorization header field would be:¶
Authorization: Basic dGVzdDoxMjPCow==
The internationalisation problem has been reported as a Mozilla bug back in the year 2000 (see <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41489> and also the more recent <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=656213>). It was Andrew Clover's idea to address it using a new auth-param.¶
|[ISO-8859-1]||International Organization for Standardization, “Information technology -- 8-bit single-byte coded graphic character sets -- Part 1: Latin alphabet No. 1”, ISO/IEC 8859-1:1998, 1998.|
|[RFC2119]||Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.|
|[RFC2617]||Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, “HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication”, RFC 2617, June 1999.|
|[RFC2978]||Freed, N. and J. Postel, “IANA Charset Registration Procedures”, BCP 19, RFC 2978, October 2000.|
|[RFC3629]||Yergeau, F., “UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646”, STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.|
|[USASCII]||American National Standards Institute, “Coded Character Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information Interchange”, ANSI X3.4, 1986.|
|[RFC4648]||Josefsson, S., “The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings”, RFC 4648, October 2006.|
|[XHR]||van Kesteren, A., “XMLHttpRequest Level 2”, W3C Working Draft WD-XMLHttpRequest2-20110816, August 2011, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2011/WD-XMLHttpRequest2-20110816/>.|
Latest version available at <http://www.w3.org/TR/XMLHttpRequest2/>.
User agents not implementing this specifications should continue to work as before, ignoring the new parameter.¶
User agents which already default to the UTF-8 encoding ↑↓
already implement this specification by definition. Note that some user agents ↑↓ already have different defaults depending on whether the request originates from page navigation as opposed to a script-driven request using XMLHttpRequest [XHR].¶
Other user agents can keep their default behavior, and switch to UTF-8 when seeing the new parameter.¶
On the other hand, the strategy below may already improve the user-visible behavior today: ¶
Note that there's a risk if the site blocks an account after multiple login failures (for instance, when it doesn't reset the counter after a successful login).¶
Origin servers that do not support non-ASCII characters in credentials do not require any changes.¶
Origin servers that need to support non-ASCII characters, but can't use the UTF-8 encoding will not be affected; they will continue to function as well as before.¶
Finally, origin servers that need to support non-ASCII characters and can use the UTF-8 encoding can opt in as described above. In the worst case, they'll continue to see either broken credentials or no credentials at all (depending on how legacy clients handle characters they can not encode).¶
There are sites in use today that default to a locale encoding, such as ISO-8859-1, and expect user agents to use that encoding. These sites will break if the user agent uses a different encoding, such as UTF-8.¶
Although the solution proposed in this document may be applicable to "Digest" as well, any attempt to update this scheme may be an uphill battle hard to win.¶
It appears they will. See <http://greenbytes.de/tech/tc/httpauth/#simplebasicnewparam1> and <http://greenbytes.de/tech/tc/httpauth/#simplebasicnewparam2>.¶
Add and close issues "credparam" and "paramcase". Rewrite the deployment considerations.¶
Note more recent Mozilla bugzilla entry; add behavior of existing UAs to FAQ (with pointer to test cases).¶