httpstate Working GroupA. Barth
Internet-DraftU.C. Berkeley
Obsoletes: 2965 (if approved)October 25, 2010
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: April 28, 2011

HTTP State Management Mechanism

Abstract

This document defines the HTTP Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields. These header fields can be used by HTTP servers to store state (called cookies) at HTTP user agents, letting the servers maintain a stateful session over the mostly stateless HTTP protocol. Although cookies have many historical infelicities that degrade their security and privacy, the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields are widely used on the Internet.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as “work in progress”.

This Internet-Draft will expire on April 28, 2011.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

If you have suggestions for improving this document, please send email to <mailto:http-state@ietf.org>. Suggestions with test cases are especially appreciated. Further Working Group information is available from <https://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpstate/>.



1. Introduction

This document defines the HTTP Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields. Using the Set-Cookie header field, an HTTP server can pass name/value pairs and associated metadata (called cookies) to a user agent. When the user agent makes subsequent requests to the server, the user agent uses the metadata and other information to determine whether to return the name/value pairs in the Cookie header.

Although simple on their surface, cookies have a number of complexities. For example, the server indicates a scope for each cookie when sending it to the user agent. The scope indicates the maximum amount of time the user agent should return the cookie, the servers to which the user agent should return the cookie, and the URI schemes for which the cookie is applicable.

For historical reasons, cookies contain a number of security and privacy infelicities. For example, a server can indicate that a given cookie is intended for "secure" connections, but the Secure attribute does not provide integrity in the presence of an active network attacker. Similarly, cookies for a given host are shared across all the ports on that host, even though the usual "same-origin policy" used by web browsers isolates content retrieved via different ports.

Prior to this document, there were at least three descriptions of cookies: the so-called "Netscape cookie specification" [Netscape], RFC 2109 [RFC2109], and RFC 2965 [RFC2965]. However, none of these documents describe how the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers are actually used on the Internet (see [Kri2001] for historical context). This document attempts to specify the syntax and semantics of these headers as they are actually used on the Internet.

Therefore, in relation to previous IETF specifications of HTTP state management mechanisms, this document requests the following actions:

  1. Change the status of [RFC2109] to Historic (it has already been obsoleted by [RFC2965]).
  2. Change the status of [RFC2965] to Historic.
  3. Indicate that [RFC2965] is obsoleted by this document.

2. Conventions

2.1. Conformance Criteria

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Requirements phrased in the imperative as part of algorithms (such as "strip any leading space characters" or "return false and abort these steps") are to be interpreted with the meaning of the key word ("MUST", "SHOULD", "MAY", etc) used in introducing the algorithm.

Conformance requirements phrased as algorithms or specific steps can be implemented in any manner, so long as the end result is equivalent. In particular, the algorithms defined in this specification are intended to be easy to understand and are not intended to be performant.

2.2. Syntax Notation

This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234].

The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in [RFC5234], Appendix B.1: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote), HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), LF (line feed), OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), HTAB (horizontal tab), CHAR (any US-ASCII character), VCHAR (any visible US-ASCII character), and WSP (whitespace).

The OWS (optional whitespace) rule is used where zero or more linear whitespace characters MAY appear:

OWS            = *( [ obs-fold ] WSP )
                 ; "optional" whitespace
obs-fold       = CRLF
          

OWS SHOULD either not be produced or be produced as a single SP character.

2.3. Terminology

The terms user agent, client, server, proxy, and origin server have the same meaning as in the HTTP/1.1 specification ([RFC2616], Section 1.3).

The request-host is the name of the host, as known by the user agent, to which the user agent is sending an HTTP request or is receiving an HTTP response from (i.e., the name of the host to which it sent the corresponding HTTP request).

The term request-uri is defined in Section 5.1.2 of [RFC2616].

Two sequences of octets are said to case-insensitively match each other if and only if they are equivalent under the i;ascii-casemap collation defined in [RFC4790].

The term string means a sequence of octets.


3. Overview

This section outlines a way for an origin server to send state information to a user agent and for the user agent to return the state information to the origin server.

To store state, the origin server includes a Set-Cookie header in an HTTP response. In subsequent requests, the user agent returns a Cookie request header to the origin server. The Cookie header contains cookies the user agent received in previous Set-Cookie headers. The origin server is free to ignore the Cookie header or use its contents for an application-defined purpose.

Origin servers can send a Set-Cookie response header with any response. An origin server can include multiple Set-Cookie header fields in a single response.

Note that folding multiple Set-Cookie header fields into a single header field might change the semantics of the header because the %x2C (",") character is used by the Set-Cookie header in a way that conflicts with such folding. This historical infelicity is incompatible with the usual mechanism for folding HTTP headers as defined in [RFC2616].

3.1. Examples

Using the Set-Cookie header, a server can send the user agent a short string in an HTTP response that the user agent will return in future HTTP requests. For example, the server can send the user agent a "session identifier" named SID with the value 31d4d96e407aad42. The user agent then returns the session identifier in subsequent requests.

== Server -> User Agent ==

Set-Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42
          

== User Agent -> Server ==

Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42
          

The server can alter the default scope of the cookie using the Path and Domain attributes. For example, the server can instruct the user agent to return the cookie to every path and every subdomain of example.com.

== Server -> User Agent ==

Set-Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42; Path=/; Domain=example.com
          

== User Agent -> Server ==

Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42
          

As shown in the next example, the server can store multiple cookies at the user agent. For example, the server can store a session identifier as well as the user's preferred language by returning two Set-Cookie header fields. Notice that the server uses the Secure and HttpOnly attributes to provide additional security protections for the more-sensitive session identifier (see Section 4.1.2.)

== Server -> User Agent ==

Set-Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Path=/; Domain=example.com
          

== User Agent -> Server ==

Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42; lang=en-US
          

Notice that the Cookie header above contains two cookies, one named SID and one named lang. If the server wishes the user agent to persist the cookie over multiple "sessions" (e.g., user agent restarts), the server can specify an expiration date in the Expires attribute. Note that the user agent might delete the cookie before the expiration date if the user agent's cookie store exceeds its quota or if the user manually deletes the server's cookie.

== Server -> User Agent ==

Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Expires=Wed, 09 Jun 2021 10:18:14 GMT
          

== User Agent -> Server ==

Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42; lang=en-US
          

Finally, to remove a cookie, the server returns a Set-Cookie header with an expiration date in the past. The server will be successful in removing the cookie only if the Path and the Domain attribute in the Set-Cookie header match the values used when the cookie was created.

== Server -> User Agent ==

Set-Cookie: lang=; Expires=Sun, 06 Nov 1994 08:49:37 GMT
          

== User Agent -> Server ==

Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42
          

4. Server Requirements

This section describes the syntax and semantics of a well-behaved profile of the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers. Servers SHOULD limit themselves to the profile described in this section, both to maximize interoperability with existing user agents and because a future version of the Cookie or Set-Cookie headers could remove support for some of the esoteric semantics described in Section 5. User agents, however, MUST implement the requirements in Section 5 to ensure interoperability with servers making use of the full semantics.


5. User Agent Requirements

For historical reasons, the full semantics of cookies (as presently deployed on the Internet) contain a number of exotic quirks. This section is intended to specify the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers in sufficient detail to allow a user agent implementing these requirements precisely to interoperate with existing servers.

5.1. Subcomponent Algorithms

This section defines some algorithms used by user agents to process specific subcomponents of the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers.

5.3. Storage Model

The user agent stores the following fields about each cookie: name, value, expiry-time, domain, path, creation-time, last-access-time, persistent-flag, host-only-flag, secure-only-flag, and http-only-flag.

When the user agent "receives a cookie" from a request-uri with name cookie-name, value cookie-value, and attributes cookie-attribute-list, the user agent MUST process the cookie as follows:

  1. A user agent MAY ignore a received cookie in its entirety. For example, the user agent might wish to block receiving cookies from "third-party" responses or the user agent might not wish to store cookies that exceed some size.
  2. Create a new cookie with name cookie-name, value cookie-value. Set the creation-time and the last-access-time to the current date and time.
  3. If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an attribute-name of "Max-Age":
    • Set the cookie's persistent-flag to true.
    • Set the cookie's expiry-time to attribute-value of the last attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with an attribute-name of "Max-Age".
    Otherwise, if the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an attribute-name of "Expires" (and does not contain an attribute with an attribute-name of "Max-Age"):
    • Set the cookie's persistent-flag to true.
    • Set the cookie's expiry-time to attribute-value of the last attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with an attribute-name of "Expires".
    Otherwise:
    • Set the cookie's persistent-flag to false.
    • Set the cookie's expiry-time to the latest representable date.
  4. If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an attribute-name of "Domain":
    • Let the domain-attribute be the attribute-value of the last attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with an attribute-name of "Domain".
    Otherwise:
    • Let the domain-attribute be the empty string.
  5. If the user agent is configured to reject "public suffixes" and the domain-attribute is a public suffix:
    • If the domain-attribute is identical to the canonicalized request-host:
      • Let the domain-attribute be the empty string.
      Otherwise:
      • Ignore the cookie entirely and abort these steps.
    • NOTE: A "public suffix" is a domain that is controlled by a public registry, such as "com", "co.uk", and "pvt.k12.wy.us". This step is essential for preventing attacker.com from disrupting the integrity of example.com by setting a cookie with a Domain attribute of "com". Unfortunately, the set of public suffixes (also known as "registry controlled domains") changes over time. If feasible, user agents SHOULD use an up-to-date public suffix list, such as the one maintained by the Mozilla project at <http://publicsuffix.org/>.
  6. If the domain-attribute is non-empty:
    • If the canonicalized request-host does not domain-match the domain-attribute:
      • Ignore the cookie entirely and abort these steps.
      Otherwise:
      • Set the cookie's host-only-flag to false.
      • Set the cookie's domain to the domain-attribute.
    Otherwise:
    • Set the cookie's host-only-flag to true.
    • Set the cookie's domain to the canonicalized request-host.
  7. If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an attribute-name of "Path", set the cookie's path to attribute-value of the last attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with an attribute-name of "Path". Otherwise, set cookie's path to the default-path of the request-uri.
  8. If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an attribute-name of "Secure", set the cookie's secure-only-flag to true. Otherwise, set cookie's secure-only-flag to false.
  9. If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an attribute-name of "HttpOnly", set the cookie's http-only-flag to true. Otherwise, set cookie's http-only-flag to false.
  10. If the cookie was received from a "non-HTTP" API and the cookie's http-only-flag is set, abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely.
  11. If the cookie store contains a cookie with the same name, domain, and path as the newly created cookie:
    1. Let old-cookie be the existing cookie with the same name, domain, and path as the newly created cookie. (Notice that this algorithm maintains the invariant that there is at most one such cookie.)
    2. If the newly created cookie was received from a "non-HTTP" API and the old-cookie's http-only-flag is set, abort these steps and ignore the newly created cookie entirely.
    3. Update the creation-time of the newly created cookie to match the creation-time of the old-cookie.
    4. Remove the old-cookie from the cookie store.
  12. Insert the newly created cookie into the cookie store.

A cookie is "expired" if the cookie has an expiry date in the past.

The user agent MUST evict all expired cookies from the cookie store if, at any time, an expired cookie exists in the cookie store.

At any time, the user agent MAY "remove excess cookies" from the cookie store if the number of cookies sharing a domain field exceeds some implementaiton defined upper bound (such as 50 cookies).

At any time, the user agent MAY "remove excess cookies" from the cookie store if the cookie store exceeds some predetermined upper bound (such as 3000 cookies).

When the user agent removes excess cookies from the cookie store, the user agent MUST evict cookies in the following priority order:

  1. Expired cookies.
  2. Cookies that share a domain field with more than a predetermined number of other cookies.
  3. All cookies.

If two cookies have the same removal priority, the user agent MUST evict the cookie with the earliest last-access date first.

When "the current session is over" (as defined by the user agent), the user agent MUST remove from the cookie store all cookies with the persistent-flag set to false.


6. Implementation Considerations

6.1. Limits

Practical user agent implementations have limits on the number and size of cookies that they can store. General-use user agents SHOULD provide each of the following minimum capabilities:

  • At least 4096 bytes per cookie (as measured by the sum of the length of the cookie's name, value, and attributes).
  • At least 50 cookies per domain.
  • At least 3000 cookies total.

Servers SHOULD use as few and as small cookies as possible to avoid reaching these implementation limits and to minimize network bandwidth due to the Cookie header being included in every request.

Servers SHOULD gracefully degrade if the user agent fails to return one or more cookies in the Cookie header because the user agent might evict any cookie at any time on orders from the user.

6.2. Application Programming Interfaces

One reason the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers uses such esoteric syntax is because many platforms (both in servers and user agents) provide a string-based application programing interface (API) to cookies, requiring application-layer programmers to generate and parse the syntax used by the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers, which many programmers have done incorrectly, resulting in interoperability problems.

Instead of providing string-based APIs to cookies, platforms would be well-served by providing more semantic APIs. It is beyond the scope of this document to recommend specific API designs, but there are clear benefits to accepting an abstract "Date" object instead of a serialized date string.

6.3. IDNA dependency and migration

IDNA2008 [RFC5890] supersedes IDNA2003 [RFC3490] but is not backwards-compatible. For this reason, there will be a transition period (possibly of a number of years). User agents SHOULD implement IDNA2008 [RFC5890] and MAY implement [Unicode Technical Standard #46 <http://unicode.org/reports/tr46/>] in order to facilitate a smoother IDNA transition. If a user agent does not implement IDNA2008, the user agent MUST implement IDNA2003 [RFC3490].


7. Privacy Considerations

Cookies are often criticized for letting servers track users. For example, a number of "web analytics" companies use cookies to recognize when a user returns to a web site or visits another web site. Although cookies are not the only mechanism servers can use to track users across HTTP requests, cookies facilitate tracking because they are persistent across user agent sessions and can be shared between hosts.

7.1. Third-Party Cookies

Particularly worrisome are so-called "third-party" cookies. In rendering an HTML document, a user agent often requests resources from other servers (such as advertising networks). These third-party servers can use cookies to track the user even if the user never visits the server directly.

Some user agents restrict how third-party cookies behave. For example, some of these user agents refuse to send the Cookie header in third-party requests. Others refuse to process the Set-Cookie header in responses to third-party requests. User agents vary widely in their third-party cookie policies. This document grants user agents wide latitude to experiment with third-party cookie policies that balance the privacy and compatibility needs of their users. However, this document does not endorse any particular third-party cookie policy.

Third-party cookie blocking policies are often ineffective at achieving their privacy goals if servers attempt to work around their restrictions to track users. In particular, two collaborating servers can often track users without using cookies at all.

7.2. User Controls

User agents should provide users with a mechanism for managing the cookies stored in the cookie store. For example, a user agent might let users delete all cookies received during a specified time period or all the cookies related to a particular domain. In addition, many user agents include a user interface element that lets users examine the cookies stored in their cookie store.

User agents should provide users with a mechanism for disabling cookies. When cookies are disabled, the user agent MUST NOT include a Cookie header in outbound HTTP requests and the user agent MUST NOT process Set-Cookie headers in inbound HTTP responses.

Some user agents provide users the option of preventing persistent storage of cookies across sessions. When configured thusly, user agents MUST treat all received cookies as if the persistent-flag were set to false.

Some user agents provide users with the ability to approve individual writes to the cookie store. In many common usage scenarios, these controls generate a large number of prompts. However, some privacy-conscious users find these controls useful nonetheless.


8. Security Considerations

8.1. Overview

Cookies have a number of security pitfalls. This section overviews a few of the more salient issues.

In particular, cookies encourage developers to rely on ambient authority for authentication, often becoming vulnerable to attacks such as cross-site request forgery. Also, when storing session identifiers in cookies, developers often create session fixation vulnerabilities.

Transport-layer encryption, such as that employed in HTTPS, is insufficient to prevent a network attacker from obtaining or altering a victim's cookies because the cookie protocol itself has various vulnerabilities (see "Weak Confidentiality" and "Weak Integrity", below). In addition, by default, cookies do not provide confidentiality or integrity from network attackers, even when used in conjunction with HTTPS.

8.2. Ambient Authority

A server that uses cookies to authenticate users can suffer security vulnerabilities because some user agents let remote parties issue HTTP requests from the user agent (e.g., via HTTP redirects or HTML forms). When issuing those requests, user agents attach cookies even if the remote party does not know the contents of the cookies, potentially letting the remote party exercise authority at an unwary server.

Although this security concern goes by a number of names (e.g., cross-site request forgery, confused deputy), the issue stems from cookies being a form of ambient authority. Cookies encourage server operators to separate designation (in the form of URLs) from authorization (in the form of cookies). Consequently, the user agent might supply the authorization for a resource designated by the attacker, possibly causing the server or its clients to undertake actions designated by the attacker as though they were authorized by the user.

Instead of using cookies for authorization, server operators might wish to consider entangling designation and authorization by treating URLs as capabilities. Instead of storing secrets in cookies, this approach stores secrets in URLs, requiring the remote entity to supply the secret itself. Although this approach is not a panacea, judicious application of these principles can lead to more robust security.

8.3. Clear Text

Unless sent over a secure channel (such as TLS), the information in the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers is transmitted in the clear.

  1. All sensitive information conveyed in these headers is exposed to an eavesdropper.
  2. A malicious intermediary could alter the headers as they travel in either direction, with unpredictable results.
  3. A malicious client could alter the Cookie header before transmission, with unpredictable results.

Servers SHOULD encrypt and sign the contents of cookies when transmitting them to the user agent (even when sending the cookies over a secure channel). However, encrypting and signing cookie contents does not prevent an attacker from transplanting a cookie from one user agent to another or from replaying the cookie at a later time.

In addition to encrypting and signing the contents of every cookie, servers that require a higher level of security SHOULD use the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers only over a secure channel. When using cookies over a secure channel, servers SHOULD set the Secure attribute (see Section 4.1.2.5) for every cookie. If a server does not set the Secure attribute, the protection provided by the secure channel will be largely moot.

8.4. Session Identifiers

Instead of storing session information directly in a cookie (where it might be exposed to or replayed by an attacker), servers commonly store a nonce (or "session identifier") in a cookie. When the server receives an HTTP request with a nonce, the server can look up state information associated with the cookie using the nonce as a key.

Using session identifier cookies limits the damage an attacker can cause if the attacker learns the contents of a cookie because the nonce is useful only for interacting with the server (unlike non-nonce cookie content, which might itself be sensitive). Furthermore, using a single nonce prevents an attacker from "splicing" together cookie content from two interactions with the server, which could cause the server to behave unexpectedly.

Using session identifiers is not without risk. For example, the server SHOULD take care to avoid "session fixation" vulnerabilities. A session fixation attack proceeds in three steps. First, the attacker transplants a session identifier from his or her user agent to the victim's user agent. Second, the victim uses that session identifier to interact with the server, possibly imbuing the session identifier with the user's credentials or confidential information. Third, the attacker uses the session identifier to interact with server directly, possibly obtaining the user's authority or confidential information.

8.5. Weak Confidentiality

Cookies do not provide isolation by port. If a cookie is readable by a service running on one port, the cookie is also readable by a service running on another port of the same server. If a cookie is writable by a service on one port, the cookie is also writable by a service running on another port of the same server. For this reason, servers SHOULD NOT both run mutually distrusting services on different ports of the same host and use cookies to store security-sensitive information.

Cookies do not provide isolation by scheme. Although most commonly used with the http and https schemes, the cookies for a given host might also be available to other schemes, such as ftp and gopher. Although this lack of isolation by scheme is most apparent in non-HTTP APIs that permit access to cookies (e.g., HTML's document.cookie API), the lack of isolation by scheme is actually present in requirements for processing cookies themselves (e.g., consider retrieving a URI with the gopher scheme via HTTP).

Cookies do not always provide isolation by path. Although the network-level protocol does not send cookies stored for one path to another, some user agents expose cookies via non-HTTP APIs, such as HTML's document.cookie API. Because some of these user agents (e.g., web browsers) do not isolate resources received from different paths, a resource retrieved from one path might be able to access cookies stored for another path.

8.6. Weak Integrity

Cookies do not provide integrity guarantees for sibling domains (and their subdomains). For example, consider foo.example.com and bar.example.com. The foo.example.com server can set a cookie with a Domain attribute of "example.com" (possibly overwriting an existing "example.com" cookie set by bar.example.com), and the user agent will include that cookie in HTTP requests to bar.example.com. In the worst case, bar.example.com will be unable to distinguish this cookie from a cookie it set itself. The foo.example.com server might be able to leverage this ability to mount an attack against bar.example.com.

Even though the Set-Cookie header supports the Path attribute, the Path attribute does not provide any integrity protection because the user agent will accept an arbitrary Path attribute in a Set-Cookie header. For example, an HTTP response to a request for http://example.com/foo/bar can set a cookie with a Path attribute of "/qux". Consequently, servers SHOULD NOT both run mutually distrusting services on different paths of the same host and use cookies to store security-sensitive information.

An active network attacker can also inject cookies into the Cookie header sent to https://example.com/ by impersonating a response from http://example.com/ and injecting a Set-Cookie header. The HTTPS server at example.com will be unable to distinguish these cookies from cookies that it set itself in an HTTPS response. An active network attacker might be able to leverage this ability to mount an attack against example.com even if example.com uses HTTPS exclusively.

Servers can partially mitigate these attacks by encrypting and signing the contents of their cookies. However, using cryptography does not mitigate the issue completely because an attacker can replay a cookie he or she received from the authentic example.com server in the user's session, with unpredictable results.

Finally, an attacker might be able to force the user agent to delete cookies by storing a large number of cookies. Once the user agent reaches its storage limit, the user agent will be forced to evict some cookies. Servers SHOULD NOT rely upon user agents retaining cookies.

8.7. Reliance on DNS

Cookies rely upon the Domain Name System (DNS) for security. If the DNS is partially or fully compromised, the cookie protocol might fail to provide the security properties required by applications.


9. IANA Considerations

The permanent message header field registry (see [RFC3864]) should be updated with the following registrations:


10. References

10.1. Normative References

[RFC1034]
Mockapetris, P., “Domain names - concepts and facilities”, STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC1123]
Braden, R., “Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and Support”, STD 3, RFC 1123, October 1989.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2616]
Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1”, RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC3490]
Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, “Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)”, RFC 3490, March 2003.
See Section 6.3 for an explanation why the normative reference to an obsoleted specification is needed.
[RFC3629]
Yergeau, F., “UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646”, STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC4790]
Newman, C., Duerst, M., and A. Gulbrandsen, “Internet Application Protocol Collation Registry”, RFC 4790, March 2007.
[RFC5234]
Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, “Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF”, STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
[RFC5246]
Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2”, RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5890]
Klensin, J., “Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework”, RFC 5890, August 2010.
[RFC5891]
Klensin, J., “Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA): Protocol”, RFC 5891, August 2010.

10.2. Informative References

[RFC2109]
Kristol, D. and L. Montulli, “HTTP State Management Mechanism”, RFC 2109, February 1997.
[RFC2965]
Kristol, D. and L. Montulli, “HTTP State Management Mechanism”, RFC 2965, October 2000.
[RFC2818]
Rescorla, E., “HTTP Over TLS”, RFC 2818, May 2000.
[Netscape]
Netscape Communications Corp., “Persistent Client State -- HTTP Cookies”, 1999, <http://web.archive.org/web/20020803110822/http://wp.netscape.com/newsref/std/cookie_spec.html>.
[Kri2001]
Kristol, D., “HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and Politics”, ACM Transactions on Internet Technology Vol. 1, #2, November 2001, <http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.SE/0105018>.
[RFC3548]
Josefsson, S., “The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings”, RFC 3548, July 2003.
[RFC3864]
Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, “Registration Procedures for Message Header Fields”, BCP 90, RFC 3864, September 2004.

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

This document borrows heavily from RFC 2109 [RFC2109]. We are indebted to David M. Kristol and Lou Montulli for their efforts to specify cookies. David M. Kristol, in particular, provided invaluable advice on navigating the IETF process. We would also like to thank Thomas Broyer, Tyler Close, Bil Corry, corvid, Lisa Dusseault, Roy T. Fielding, Blake Frantz, Anne van Kesteren, Eran Hammer-Lahav, Jeff Hodges, Bjoern Hoehrmann, Achim Hoffmann, Georg Koppen, Dean McNamee, Mark Miller, Mark Pauley, Yngve N. Pettersen, Julian Reschke, Peter Saint-Andre, Mark Seaborn, Maciej Stachowiak, Daniel Stenberg, Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa, David Wagner, Dan Winship, and Dan Witte for their valuable feedback on this document.


Author's Address

Adam Barth
University of California, Berkeley
EMail: abarth@eecs.berkeley.edu
URI: http://www.adambarth.com/